St. John's Law Review
Volume 40
Number 1 Volume 40, December 1965, Number
1

Article 40

CPLR 2221: Motion Made to Two Justices Sitting in the Same
Court
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL.. 40

of the Advisory Committee1 31 -all
of which allow the court to
disregard defects which do not prejudice substantial rights of a
party. It should also be noted that a one-year limitation in which
to make a motion to set aside a judicial sale is applicable under

CPLR 2003.
ARTICLE 22-

STAYS, MOTIONS,

ORDERS AND MANDATES

CPLR 2214(b): Improper notice of motion constitutes
jurisdictional defect.
CPLR 2214(b) requires that notice of motion and the supporting affidavits be served at least eight days before the return
date, and CPLR 2103(b) (2) requires that three additional days
be added to this period when service is by mail. In Thrasher
v. United States Liab. Ins. Co.,132 the defendant moved to consolidate two actions; only ten days notice of motion was given
and service was made by mail. The court denied the motion because of the one day service defect holding that the plaintiff's
failure to appear on the return date did not constitute a waiver
of the improper notice. Since improper notice is a jurisdictional
133
defect, it cannot be waived by default.
It appears, however, unduly harsh to make improper notice
of motion a jurisdictional defect in view of the fact that a show
cause order under CPLR 2214(d) might have been obtained
and the period of notice drastically reduced.
It is submitted, therefore, that the better rule would be to
make improper notice of motion a procedural irregularity which
would be deemed waived unless an objection was raised thereto.
CPLR 2221:

Motion made to two justices sitting
in same court.

In Collins, Inc. v. Oisker-McLain Indus., Inc.,134 a motion to
consolidate certain actions was denied by a justice sitting in.
special term. However, the order denying consolidation was neither
signed nor entered. Subsequently, the petitioner moved to consolidate before a different justice sitting in calendar term of
the same court. The motion was then granted. On appeal, the
order granting the second motion was vacated, the appellate
division ruling that the decision of the first justice established
131 FOURTH

REP. 54.

13245 Misc. 2d 681, 257 N.Y.S2d 360 (Sup. Ct N.Y. County 1965).

133 Accord, Morabito v. Champion Swimming Pool Corp., 18 App. Div.
2d 706, 236 N.Y.S.2d 130 (2d Dep't 1962).
134 22 App. Div. 2d 485, 257 N.Y.S.2d 201 (4th Dep't 1965).
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the law of the case and was therefore binding upon all courts
of co-ordinate jurisdiction. 35
The court's refusal to sanction this procedure, which involves,
in effect, taking an appeal to a justice sitting in the same court,
is supported by the tenor of CPLR 2221 and 2217(a). These
sections provide that "any motion may be referred to a judge
who decided a prior motion in the action," 136 and that a motion
affecting a prior order "shall be made . . . to the judge who
signed the order. .
. A motion made to other than a proper
judge under this rule shall be transferred to the proper judge." 137
While the above cited sections did not bind the court in this
situation, they evidence a legislative intention to prohibit the procedure employed by the petitioner in the instant case.
ARTICLE 26CPLR 2606:

PROPERTY PAID INTO COURT

Obtaining order for payment out of court.

The application for obtaining a court order for the payment
of property previously paid into court can be made either by
motion or by special proceeding." s In the case of Application of
Godfrey,' 39 the petitioner utilized the special proceeding. The
court considered this procedure preferable because the courtdesignated custodian, the county treasurer, no longer had possession
of the property but had erroneously released the money to the
state comptroller and thus was not a party to the application. As
a result of this voluntary relinquishment, the supreme court noted
that although the order withdrawing the funds should emanate
1 40
from the court which directed that the property be paid into court,'
here, the action of the treasurer removed it from the exclusive
control of the county court and thus allowed the supreme court to
assume jurisdiction. Although CPLR 2606 and 2607 require the
petitioner to show that he is the person entitled to payment, it
does not specify the manner of proof formerly required by RCP
5
13
Id. at 489, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 205.
136 CPLR 2 217(a).
137 CPLR 2221.
138 CPLR 2606. The purpose of this rule and rule 2607 is to prevent

the property from being released upon unlawful claims.
County of
Tompkins v. Ingersoll, 81 App. Div. 344, 347, 81 N.Y. Supp. 242, 245-46

(3d Dep't 1903), aff'd, 177 N.Y. 543, 69 N.E. 1132 (1904).
1390 46 Misc. 2d 452, 259 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Sup. Ct Nassau County 1965).

46Zirinsky v. Pesce, 188 Misc. 539, 68 N.Y.S2d 309 (N.Y. City Ct.
1947); People v. Brown, 83 Misc. 495, 146 N.Y. Supp. 123 (Sup. Ct.
1914). This procedure is continued under CPLR 2606 (2). See 2 WEIxsTEI,
KORN & MrnLLm, Nmv YoRK Cnim PRAcrncE [2606.01 (1964).

